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Switzerland is a highly urbanised country. Today, the growing metropolitan areas do not cor-
respond to the political-administrative boundaries anymore. In terms of political institutions, 
Swiss metropolitan areas are highly fragmented; this poses a challenge for the governance 
capacity in urban areas. In 2001, a federal agglomeration policy was launched, marking the 
first time the federal government directly interfered in urban affairs. With this new agglom-
eration policy, the federal government wants to foster vertical and horizontal cooperation 
between the different federal levels. 
Whereas theories of federalism help to understand systems of interlocking politics in multi-
level governance, the politics of scale approach draws attention to the relationship and the 
distribution of power among different federal state levels. Drawing a link between theories of 
federalism and the politics of scale approach, this paper proposes a theoretical framework to 
analyse the construction of new levels of governance and of the structures of negotiation be-
tween the different levels of governance within the multi-tiered hierarchy. Tackling the ques-
tion of multilevel governance with an analysis of the politics of scale will allow me to desig-
nate new conflict lines and the change in the relationship between the different federal state 




Metropolitan growth is a worldwide topic. Today, over 50 percent of the world population 
lives in urban areas (DESA, 2012). Even though the image of Switzerland as a rural “Heidi-
land” still persists – and the Swiss do not identify themselves with an urban country – Swit-
zerland is in fact a highly urbanised country. Two third of the Swiss population live in city 
regions (Kübler, 2006: 260). According to the Federal Statistical Office, there are 50 agglom-
erations and five metropolitan regions in Switzerland. The term „agglomeration“ refers to a 
coherent area with at least 20’000 inhabitants. Agglomerations consist of a core city and mu-
nicipalities that are connected to this core city (several indicators for this connectedness exist, 
e.g. commuter movements, see Schuler et al., 2005). Metropolitan areas are larger urban areas 
and consist of more than one agglomeration. 
Despite the demographic and economic relevance of agglomerations and metropolitan areas 
in Switzerland, city-regions do not have an independent position in the Swiss federal system 
(Klöti et al., 1993). Swiss urban areas are functional spaces. They have continued to extend 
over and across institutional boundaries. Since there were no significant territorial reforms 
since 1934, metropolitan areas in Switzerland are characterized by high governmental frag-
mentation. According to the Federal Statistical Office, there is a growing number of com-
munes which are characterised as urban, and population has grown significantly in city re-
gions (see figure 1). This signifies a missing congruence between the functional and the insti-
tutional territories. Because of the institutional fragmentation, communes within an agglom-
eration have to cooperate with other communes. Especially the core cities cover services not 
only for their own commune, but for residents of the whole agglomeration. As in other coun-
tries, this leads to centrality charges for core cities. The process of metropolitanisation affects 
the architecture of intergovernmental relations (Kübler et al., 2003: 263). As Kübler et al. 
(2003: 269) point out, the process of metropolitanisation and the accompanying change of the 
architecture of intergovernmental relations includes a rising level of conflict between different 
federal state levels and between city regions itself in general. It is widely assumed that cities 
and urban regions gain importance as relevant levels of regulation (see e.g. Le Galès, 2002, 
Brenner, 2004). But the Swiss federal system does not reflect the weight of cities at all. On 
the contrary, rural and mountain areas are overrepresented. Up until the end of the 20th cen-
tury, cities were not even mentioned in the Swiss Constitution. Only in 1999 did the new con-
stitution include a new article (Article 50) which mentions cities and agglomerations for the 
first time (Fiechter, 2010).1 The new Article 50 obliges the Confederation to consider the 
situation of urban as well as rural areas. Based on this new article, the Swiss Federal Govern-
ment initiated in 2001 the so-called “agglomeration policy”. With the agglomeration policy, 
the federal government for the first time became involved directly with metropolitan govern-
ance. The federal government wants to support the cantons and communes in their activities 
of inter-municipal cooperation in metropolitan regions. The overall goal is to strengthen the 
economic attractivity of the densely populated, urbanised regions and to provide higher qual-                                                        1 The federal constitution was wholly revised in the 1990, and was approved by vote in 1999.  
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ity of life for the inhabitants (Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung ARE and Staatssekretariat für 
Wirtschaft SECO, 2006). Eventually this should strengthen the positions of cities and ag-
glomerations within the federal system. This means that the federal government gets involved 
in urban governance questions. It remains an open question, whether the federal agglomera-
tion policy affects governance schemes at the metropolitan level and therefore really changes 
the relationship between the different federal state levels. 
In order to analyse the impact of federal agglomeration policy on Swiss federalism, we need a 
theoretical framework that addresses the construction of new levels of governance and of the 
structures of negotiation between the different levels of governance within the multi-tiered 
hierarchy. Two main research traditions are suitable to generate such a framework: on the one 
hand the theoretical work on metropolitan governance. Metropolitan governance studies look 
into steering capacity in metropolitan regions, they analyse development, causes, and conse-
quences of different types of metropolitan governance. Within the metropolitan governance 
debate, the politics of scale approach is of special interest for our purpose, because it draws 
attention to the relationship and the distribution of power among different federal state levels. 
On the other hand theories of federalism help to understand systems of interlocking politics in 
multi-level governance and the role and authority of local government. There is a lot of work 
about problems of multi-level governance and possible kinds of co-operation schemes. But it 
is rarely discussed, if and how new state levels emerge, what role they play, and how they are 
framed. Because the rising level of conflicts between different state levels is hardly addressed 
in federalism research studies, this paper wants to draw a link between theories of federalism 
and the politics of scale approach. Tackling the question of multilevel governance with an 
analysis of the politics of scale will allow us to designate new conflict lines and the change in 
the relationship between the different federal state levels. 
For some time, research addressing challenges to the Swiss federal system has pointed to the 
unclear role and function of agglomerations in the Swiss federal system (see e.g. Klöti, 2006, 
Schenkel, 2001, Vatter, 2006). Almost twenty years ago, scholars (Klöti et al., 1993: 180) 
demanded from the federal government an explicit city and agglomeration policy and im-
provements in the vertical cooperation of the federal, cantonal, and local level. Klöti, Halde-
mann and Schenkel (1993: 181) did not in mainly promote an improvement in the legal status 
of cities – which has meanwhile been achieved with the new constitutional article 50 – but a 
gradual solution of steering problems in agglomerations through increasing cooperation be-
tween cities, communes of the agglomeration, cantons and the federal government. Horizontal 
and vertical cooperation schemes within the Swiss federal system could alleviate some ag-
glomeration problems, but in respect to informal processes, questions about the legitimacy of 
such decision making processes increasingly arise (Vatter and Wälti, 2003). Some scholars 
concluded that increasing horizontal and vertical cooperation would turn the Swiss co-
operative federal system toward a multi-level system (Kübler et al., 2003: 264). Others sup-
pose the traditional federal system to be still dominant despite some new forms of metropoli-
tan governance (van der Heiden, 2010). However, it is not easy to make general statements 
about how the metropolitanisation process affected/s Swiss federalism. To analyse govern-
ance change, it is often more fruitful to move to the metropolitan level. Various studies focus-
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ing on governance in Swiss agglomerations analyse types of metropolitan governance settings 
in different urban areas (e.g. Kübler and Schwab, 2007, Sager, 2005, Koch, 2011). They find 
different governance settings and – depending on this – differences in the quality of decision-
making-processes (Kübler and Schwab, 2007, Sager, 2005), and also differences in forms of 
governance change (Koch, 2011). 
In the following, the paper gives an overview of the main arguments of the two theoretical 
strands mentioned above, theories of federalism and politics of scale. Based on this, we pre-
sent a theoretical framework that fills in the missing link between these two theoretical tradi-
tions and provides the relevant theoretical research questions. The third section of the paper 
discusses the impact of the Swiss federal agglomeration policy on Swiss federalism against 
the backdrop of this theoretical framework. This is only a first empirical step. In the conclu-
sion, further research topics are developed.  
Figure 1: Swiss agglomerations, cities, and metropolitan regions 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office. 
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Theoretical reflections on governance change 
a) Theories of federalism: cooperation in multi-level governance systems 
There seems to be a renewed attention of political science to institutional arrangements and 
how political authority is dispersed among two or more levels of government (Erk and 
Swenden, 2010). For a long time theories of federalism have been concerned with questions 
derived from the structure of negotiation in intergovernmental cooperation. Federalism stud-
ies analyse vertically divided political authority between orders of government. It is not our 
goal here to characterise federalism in an integral way.2 But in theories of federalism we find 
answers to the question of how governance in metropolitan areas can be achieved, that is, how 
the different state authorities can cooperate. Especially theories of interlocking politics and of 
multi-level governance can help to understand the organisational relations between different 
state levels in federal systems (Kübler et al., 2003: 269). 
According to Scharpf (1978), there are two kinds of cooperation: vertical and horizontal inte-
gration. The different federal state levels were never totally separated and autonomous. Verti-
cal and horizontal intergovernmental relations are not new phenomena. But it is widely ar-
gued that such multi-level relations increased with economic growth and globalisation. Sys-
tems of negotiation exist not only in several fields of policies but also in and between all lev-
els of the state (Grande, 1995: 327). This leads us to the assumption that the process of more 
vertical and horizontal cooperation (or the focus on the new ‘metropolitan scale’) increasingly 
leads to conflicts between scales. Scharpf defines the problem of joint decision trap in federa-
tions: According to him (1988: 254), there are two “simple and powerful conditions” for joint 
decision trap: The dependence of decisions upon the agreement of constituent governments, 
and the fact that the agreement has to be unanimous. Scharpf (258ff.) distinguishes between 
„problem-solving“ and „bargaining“ style of decision-making. According to Scharpf’s theory, 
it is only possible to overcome sub-optimal policy outcomes under the before mentioned con-
ditions, if a “problem-solving” style of decision-making can be maintained. In addition to the 
discussion about joint decision-making in federations this topic is also eminent with regard to 
the European integration process. Grande (1995) argues that the complexity of the state has 
increased, which has leaded to increasing joint decision-making between the different federal 
state levels. With regard to the European integration process, Grande speaks of a specific 
multi-level governance system with three conflict lines: institutional, material, and ideological 
(the so-called "Mehrebenenverflechtung", Grande, 1995: 329).  
As a concept multi-level governance was established in political science with the European 
integration process (Benz, 1998: 558f.) Multi-level governance is not a new phenomenon, 
since cooperative federalism never tends to separate the different federal levels but aims at the 
coordination of the mutual dependences. Therefore, joint decision-making is very typical for 
multi-level governance. But what do we actually mean when we speak about multi-level gov-                                                        2 For the discussion of different types of federalism see e.g. Riker (1987), Elazar (1987), Lijphart (1999).  
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ernance? Multi-level governance is different from a hierarchical system (Benz, 2004: 126f.). 
According to Hooghe (1996: 18, cited in Benz, 2004: 129) multi-level governance are “vari-
able combinations of governments on multiple layers of authority [...]. The relations are char-
acterized by mutual interdependence on each others’ resources, not by competition for scarce 
resources”. We speak of levels of governance, because the system is organised based on dif-
ferent territories. Although the competences are organised according to the levels of such sys-
tems (most typically federations), a lot of tasks are interdependent and the decisions at differ-
ent levels need to be coordinated in many policy-fields. The term “governance in multi-level 
systems” implies that political processes transcend levels. Therefore, joint decision (“Politik-
verflechtung”) is an important feature of multi-level governance systems. Benz (1998) distin-
guishes to kinds of coordination in multi-level systems: in hierarchically structured coopera-
tion (“tight coupling”), higher levels can make binding decisions for lower levels whereas 
cooperation in non hierarchical structure follow the principles of “loose coupling”. In “loose 
coupled” areas of negotiation, decision-making processes take place in informal procedures 
and through the medium of information (565).  
The problem of joint decision-making is closely related to concept of multi-level governance 
accordingly. According to Stein and Turkewitsch (2008: 7) multi-level governance was a 
“broadening of the concept of federalism to include more than two levels of government and 
more than autonomous policy-making structures”. The use of the multi-level governance-
concept allows catching the broad scope of decision-making, numerous types of decision-
makers, and multiple levels of decision making (8). The concept of multi-level governance 
does not just include more decision-making levels (supranational and local level) than the 
concept of federalism usually consists of. We do not understand multi-level governance as a 
theory, but more a descriptive concept: The concept of multi-level governance takes into ac-
count the role of the local level (24). Whereas in theories about federalism, the local govern-
ments are perceived as weak authorities, the concept of multi-level governance “highlights the 
growing importance of actors at the regional and the local level” (ibid.). We agree with Stein 
and Turketwitsch when they say that the multi-level government is not only a descriptive con-
cept but has also – like federalism – normative attributes (26). Researchers who use the multi-
level governance concept normally throw a positive light on intertwined negotiation systems. 
Therefore the emphasis is more on cooperation than on conflict in joint decision-making and 
more on partnership (27). Although I use the term multi-level governance, my intention is to 
look exactly at the conflictive aspects of joint decision-making.  
But as Benz (2004: 130) points out, a distinct definition of multi-level governance does not 
exist. The word governance implies that in addition to public actors, private actors are in-
volved in decision making too. Analyses of urban politics need to include also nongovern-
mental players and need to have always a multi-level focus (Kübler and Pagano, 2012). Over 
all, the concept of multi-level governance puts a focus first on territorially organised political 
entities, called levels; second on the political structures and processes that connect these lev-
els and third, on the interrelations between the processes and rules that connect these levels 
and the processes and rules within those levels (Benz, 2004: 131). 
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To analyse the impact of the Swiss federal agglomeration policy on Swiss federalism, we 
have to address the question of federal change from a theoretical point of view. According to 
Colino (2010: 17), studies about federalism lack a theory about the explanation of change: 
“Change has been mainly conceptualized in terms of growing centralization-decentralization 
[…], cooperation-competition […] and symmetry-asymmetry”. But the capacity for adapta-
tion of federal systems differs. In his view, studies about change of federal systems so far are 
limited to either long-term structural or systemic explanations or to an actor-centred focus. 
Therefore Colino elaborates a conceptual framework to analyse federal change. He distin-
guishes two main dimensions: the integration-disintegration of the formal framework and the 
centripetality-centrifugality of  federal relations (22ff.). The formal framework dimensions 
include the constitutional design, the intergovernmental structure of decision and resources, 
and the intergovernmental decision-making rules. The federal relations dimensions include 
the interaction and joint decision styles, the type of governmental actors’ strategies, and the 
conflict lines and intergovernmental coalitions. According to these dimensions, he character-
ises four ideal types of federal subsystems (“balanced”, unitary, segmented, “accommoda-
tion”) for comparison (24). Since it is not our goal to compare federal systems, we do not use 
these ideal types. But we can draw on the six dimensions to describe the federal character of 
metropolitan regions and to find relevant dimension of change of the federal constellations 
therein. 
A federal system divides power between institutions and levels of government. But tensions 
exist between shared rule and autonomy (Benz and Colino, 2011: 384): shared rules ease co-
ordination between levels of governments but makes policy making more difficult on lower 
levels of government. According to Benz and Colino (385), who refer to Riker, federations 
suffer from instability because of two self-enforcing processing, either the tendency towards 
over-centralization or towards excessive decentralization. In other words, there are two direc-
tions of change: on the one hand centripetal and on the other hand centrifugal tendencies in 
the allocation of power (Benz, 2008: 3). Federal systems are constantly affected by such cen-
tripetal and centrifugal mechanism. Benz speaks about “implicit constitutional change” in 
contrast to “explicit constitutional change”, but a change of the formal constitution is rather 
difficult (6).  
According to Benz and Colino (2011) processes of social change are the causes of change in 
federations. Processes of social change  “lead to a ‘rescaling’ of tasks and calls for a revision 
of the allocation of powers and resources” (Benz and Colino, 2011: 385f.). They identify 
three mechanisms of collective action that have an impact on the organisation of democratic 
federations (386): mobility of actors, loyalty of individuals to a group, and political structur-
ing of actors. First, the mobility of actors does not necessarily lead to a reorganisation of terri-
tories but often call for intergovernmental arrangements. Second: changes in loyalties – e.g. 
because of the increasing mobility across political boundaries – can affect federal structures. 
This is especially important for our purpose, when we look at the emergence of new federal 
state levels. It can be assumed that without a certain loyalty (or identification) towards the 
metropolitan region/agglomeration, it is not likely that a new federal level can emerge. Third, 
the political structuring of collective interest has an effect on federal structures (e.g. changes 
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in political parties and party systems) (386). According to Riker (1965, cited in Benz, 2008: 
32), the “party system is an important factor to explain the dynamics of federalism”.3  
According to Benz and Colino (2011: 390), possible objects of constitutional change are the 
authority, fiscal relations and fiscal autonomy, representation and participation in central de-
cisions (e.g. vertical and horizontal intergovernmental bodies), and symbolic or community 
recognition. They distinguish between federal change initiated at “constitutional level” or at 
the “level of normal policy making” and between the two causes “intentional actions and con-
straints” and “institutional tensions and ideas” (391). The implicit change of patterns of gov-
ernance is especially interesting for our purpose. This is at the level of normal policy making 
and is caused by intentional actions and constraints. The main actors involved in this mecha-
nism are federal and regional ministers and elected officials, non-elected officials in sectoral 
departments (396). Also interesting for our purpose is the mechanism of “intergovernmental 
competition” and “’paradigmatic’ shifts in ideas and values” they identify. Causes for this 
mechanism are institutional tensions and ideas, the main actors involved are governments, 
political parties, public opinion, and experts (396). 
All these elements of federalism theories help to analyse and understand cooperation in multi-
level governance systems and changes in the relationship between the different federal state 
levels. But these theories of federalism generally do not deal with possible new levels of gov-
ernance within the national state, since their focus is on the one hand on the ‘old’ institution-
alised federal levels and on the other hand on the emergence of new supranational levels. Also 
Benz does not mention the emergence and role of “new” levels in multi-level governance sys-
tems. But these are very common not only in the scientific literature but also in everyday life, 
when we speak of the new metropolitan level. In the Swiss context, the term “agglomeration” 
is also very common. Although Swiss federalism did not undergo a major change, the ag-
glomeration is often treated as a possible new fourth level of governance. Therefore, the next 
section looks into interscalar relations, the production of new scales and changing hierarchies.  
b) Politics of Scale: cities in a globalised world 
Le Galès (2002) describes the transformation of European cities during the process of global-
isation and new forms of governance that came along: the gap between the limited political 
autonomy of urban regions and their growing economic importance in globalized capitalism 
put pressure on existing intergovernmental relations. According to Le Galès (260), this leads 
to a strengthening of the cities against the sub-national and national level in the long-term. 
This would provide new opportunities for cities and agglomerations because of the regained 
economic and political influence of urban areas. Le Galès (2003) calls this – very optimistic – 
appraisal "le retour des villes". This would lead us to the initial hypothesis that in the course 
of the change in the governance structures, cities and urban areas actually have gained impor-
tance and influence in the federal system. As we will see, there is another more common, but 
also more pessimistic view on the changing architecture of governance in multi-level systems.                                                          3 According to Riker’s theory, “an integrative party system reduces incentives of federal and regional gov-ernments to change the balance of power to their individual profit” (Riker 1964, cited in Benz, 2008: 2). 
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From the point of view of the rescaling theory, political responsibilities have altered (Brenner, 
2004): with the ongoing globalisation process, cities gained importance – not only in eco-
nomic, but also in political matters. The rescaling theory predicts a shift in political steering 
capacities, not only from the national state to supranational bodies (e.g. the EU) but also to 
urban areas. With these ongoing “glocalisation”-processes (Swyngedouw, 1997), metropoli-
tan regions became nodal points in economic processes (van der Heiden, 2010). According to 
Brenner (2002: 18) the process of rescaling on the one hand strengthens neoconservative and 
neoliberal political forces. But on the other hand, Brenner sees a potential for democratic mo-
bilization. This means that rescaling does not necessarily foster (or lead to) neoliberal poli-
cies. In principle, this process could enable alternative policies such as those implied by Le 
Galès with his “le retour des villes” assumption. 
The process of scaling is an expression of social-spatial processes (Brenner, 2000): scales 
have different social-spatial characteristics which also influences the relationship between 
different scales. Therefore, geographical scales are always embedded in a certain power struc-
ture. The “politics of scale” approach helps us to better understand these processes. Referring 
to Lefebvre and Castells, Brenner (366) points out that the territorial organization, the social 
production, the political contestation and the historical reconfiguration of geographical scales 
is a very important research topic. Scale is not a pre-given physical space: “geographical scale 
is socially produced and simultaneously a platform and container of certain kinds of social 
activity. [...] Far from neutral and fixed, therefore, geographical scales are the product of eco-
nomic, political and social activities and relationships; as such they are as changeable as those 
relationships themselves” (Neil Smith, 1995, 60-61, cited in Brenner, 2004: 8f.). It was Le-
febvre who turned the focus towards a ‘multiscalar politics of scale’ and he focused not only 
on the definitions of different scales but also upon interscalar relations and the struggles to 
transform scalar hierarchies (Brenner, 2000: 374). Therefore the term ‘politics of scale’ im-
plies that scalar hierarchies as scales itself are not pre-given or fix. They are contested and can 
be reorganised and transcended. As Brenner (374) points out: “[...] the power to reorganize 
geographical scales – in their role both as containers and as hierarchies – has become an es-
sential basis for the power to command and control social space as a whole”. Referring to 
Smith, Brenner defines politics of scale as follows: “In the context of contemporary debates 
on urban governance, the politics of scale refers to the decentering of traditional national ur-
ban hierarchies and national intergovernmental systems and to the concomitant emergence of 
new subnational political strategies to position cities and regions within supranational circuits 
of capital, money, commodities and labor” (Brenner, 2002: 4). Brenner identifies three politi-
cal strategies that may lie behind metropolitan reform initiatives: accumulation strategies, 
redistributive strategies, state strategies. State strategies include forms of coordination be-
tween organisations within an urban region or the organisation of the division of responsibili-
ties (Brenner, 2003: 314). Although Brenner doesn’t mention who is supporting such state 
strategies, we can assume that officials are concerned with challenges to the federal hierarchy 
within metropolitan areas and in the nation as a whole due to the changing institutional design 
in metropolitan areas. 
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The concept of “Politics of scale” includes two different aspects (Brenner, 2001, Koch, 2011). 
On the one hand, Brenner (2001: 598) identifies a “singular” meaning of politics of scale. 
This is found in studies about politics of scale, which focus on the construction of a scale, its 
definition and importance (or in other words: the “content” of particular scales). On the other 
hand, there is a “plural” meaning of politics of scale. This means the focus on the relationship 
between the different state levels (Koch, 2011: 33), or – in Brenner’s words: the “changing 
positionalities [of scales] in relation to other geographical scales and scaling processes” 
(2001: 603). Brenner does not question the importance of research focusing on the construc-
tion of scales (e.g. the work of Marston, 2000), but he insists that this has been researched 
exhaustively and that the “plural” meaning of “politics of scale” is more interesting. Brenner 
(2001: 601) identifies a general methodological shortcoming when he points out that the mere 
existence of a scalar organization does not automatically results in relevant scale effects. For 
“the notion of a politics of scale refers to the production, reconfiguration or contestation of 
particular differentiations, orderings and hierarchies among geographical scales” (600). The 
distinction of state power between the regional and the local scale is intertwined with the spa-
tial centralisation of state power within a national territory (605). The evolution of scales and 
the change of scalar structuration is path-dependent and incremental (607). Therefore the 
characteristics of federations have to be taken into account when we want to research the evo-
lution and changing hierarchies among different levels of governance. State institutions play a 
significant role (but are not the only ones) in producing and modifying scalar hierarchies. Ac-
cording to Brenner, it is a largely neglected research topic to investigate the conditions under 
which scalar structuration generates social, spatial and scalar effects (606). Form the politics 
of scale approach, we therefore derive the general assumption that in the age of globalisation, 
governance models in city regions changed, and cities and agglomerations gained steering 
capacities, having therefore more influence in the federal system.  
The next section looks at those different types of metropolitan governance. I will argue that 
these models of governance imply different relative strengths of scale within the federal sys-
tem. 
c) Types of Governance and the distribution of power 
What is the solution to problems of joint decision-making in functionally integrated metro-
politan areas? There is a long debate about the organisation of governance in city regions. 
Different types of governance provide different solutions to the above discussed problems of 
policy-coordination; they reach from centralisation to decentralisation and form consolidation 
to further fragmentation of metropolitan areas (for an overview, see Kübler and Pagano, 2012, 
Savitch and Vogel, 2009). Basically, there are three theoretical approaches, each of which 
reflects an ideal type of metropolitan governance: the metropolitan reform, the public choice, 
and the new regionalism tradition. These types of metropolitan governance reflect different 
theoretical perspectives on the problem of steering capacities in city regions (for this and in 
the following, see Kübler, 2003, Savitch and Vogel, 2009). 
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The metropolitan government tradition sees fragmentation as the main problem in urban ar-
eas. This model asks for metropolitan governments in order that the political boundaries cor-
respond to the functional boundaries. This can be reached through amalgamations or with an 
additional political layer at the level of the metropolitan area. In the 1960s and 1970s such 
metropolitan political institutions were introduced widely. These centralised and consolidated 
institutions emphasized administrative modernization, efficient delivery of public services, 
and interterritorial equalization (Brenner, 2003: 300). But these large scale projects of metro-
politan governance were abandoned by the early 1980s. In the 1950s, the public choice tradi-
tion emerged as a critique of the metropolitan reform tradition. Based on economic theories, 
the public choice model sees fragmentation as the best solution. In this view, competition be-
tween independent communes leads to efficient public service production.  
In the 1990s, a second wave of metropolitan reform tradition emerged throughout Western 
Europe (Brenner, 2003: 302). The new wave of metropolitan governance reforms – also 
called ‘new regionalism’ has a different focus. Instead of institutional reforms, this model 
promotes cooperation between private and public actors which leads to a complex interlinked 
system of cooperation. The metropolitan reform tradition favours decentralized approaches to 
problem-solving which promote cooperation, coordination and collaboration within policy-
networks, rather than structural consolidation (Brenner, 2002: 9). According to the new re-
gionalism approach, there is no absolute need for new territorial institutions, because volun-
tary new forms of cooperation emerge between public and private actors.  
Brenner (2003: 302-04) identifies four trends that are strongly connected to the new regional-
ism tradition: First, the new metropolitan reform strategies are itself a form of locational pol-
icy. Second, the new regionalism tradition is embedded in narratives of globalization and 
European interspatial competition. Third, metropolitan governance is no longer understood as 
a “vertical, coordinative and redistributive relationship within a national administrative hier-
archy” but as a “horizontal, competitive and developmentalist relationship between subna-
tional economic territories battling against one another at European and global scales to at-
tract external capital investment” (Brenner, 2003: 303). And forth, the new metropolitan re-
form initiatives go along with confrontation between opposed political-economic forces and 
territories. According to Brenner (304), the new regionalism approach assumes that regions 
act in competitive mode against each other. Along with metropolitan governance reform ini-
tiatives, the function of national states are being “upscaled and downscaled towards a variety 
of (pre-existent and newly created) institutional levels within an increasingly multitiered po-
litical architecture” (307). Three trends go along with this new wave of metropolitan institu-
tional reform (Jessop, 2000): first, the internationalization of the state; second, a denationali-
zation of the state (up- and downscaling), and third, a destatization that includes new forms of 
partnership (e.g. public private partnerships). Brenner criticises the new regionalism ap-
proach: his main critique is that new regionalism provides the basis to foster and legitimate 
uneven spatial development (Brenner, 2003: 306). Uneven development seems to be not a 
problem anymore but rather the basis for strategies of economic development (308). Re-
scaling of urban governance has been dominated by entrepreneurial projects to increase the 
economic competitiveness of the city regions (372). According to Brenner’s critical look at 
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the new regionalism approach, the focus on economic growth and especially locational poli-
cies makes binding coordination impossible and leads to uneven development. Therefore, new 
regionalism is a clearly ideological concept. Brenner accuses the new regionalism approach to 
be a medium to further hollow out the welfare states, which have been undermined already 
since the early 1970. But we have to bear in mind when we look at Switzerland that in con-
trast to other European countries, where welfare national states have been undermined since 
the early 1970, Switzerland did not witnesses a reduction of the welfare state in general. The 
share of national income of the core areas of the welfare state (as social security, health care 
and education) continually increased until the end of the 20th Century.4 It is very interesting 
to use the politics of scale approach for a Swiss case study because the argument that the new 
metropolitan governance reforms go along with the undermining of welfare policies doesn’t 
hold here. 
Brenner (2002: 10) sees the metropolitan reform initiatives that he calls “new regionalism” as 
expressions of a new politics of scales. But Savitch and Vogel (2009) make an important dis-
tinction. In addition to the three approaches metropolitan reform, public choice, and new re-
gionalism, they define a fourth theoretical position to metropolitan governance that is primar-
ily based on the work of Brenner. They call this fourth type rescaling & reterritorialisation. 
This fourth model is based on the assumptions of new regionalism, but defines the role of the 
city in new way. According to the “rescaling & reterritorialisation” tradition, the economic 
globalisation process leads to a mechanism of inter-urban competition. Urban governance is 
not oriented towards the local provision of services anymore. It is outward-oriented and the 
main goal is to position the city in the international benchmark of city regions. These com-
petitive mechanisms lead to state restructuring on the sub-national level (Savitch and Vogel, 
2009: 116). This distinction between the new regionalism model and the “rescaling & reterri-
torialisation” model (which includes more or less the basic arguments Brenner brings up with 
regard to new regionalism reform initiatives) is helpful because it takes into account the new 
role of cities in a global economic interurban competition.  
If we are interested in the relation of power between the different levels of governance, we 
need a theoretical framework to conceptualize the distribution of power. Scholars criticise the 
metropolitan governance theory for not taking into account the question of power (Mayntz, 
2004: 74-75). We assume that the different types of governance imply different sociospatial 
dimensions and different relative strengths of scales within the federal system. In a first step, 
we allocate forms of sociospatial relations to the four models of governance. Doing this, we 
follow the originators of the “scalar turn”, who recently claimed to take into account territory, 
place, scale and networks as relationally intertwined dimensions of sociospatial dimensions 
(Jessop et al., 2008). As table 1 shows, each of the four dimensions is in line with one of the 
four models of governance. In a next step, we tried to allocate different types of power distri-
bution to the four governance models and the according sociospatial relations (see Table 1). 
In the metropolitan governance tradition, power is centralised in consolidated institutions, 
either trough amalgamations or the institutionalisation of a metropolitan government with                                                          4 For a discussion about the Swiss welfare system, see Bonoli and Häusermann (2011). 
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general decision-making power. In the case of Switzerland, this could also mean that the level 
of the cantons would be the dominant level. The public choice tradition favours independent 
competing jurisdictions. Therefore, we conclude that the distribution of power in this type of 
governance is fragmented/competing. For city regions in the Swiss federal system, this means 
that municipalities are the main actors. The distribution of power in the new regionalism 
model is diffuse: cooperation between public and private actors and between the different 
federal state level are typical for this governance model. Therefore we find no dominant level 
of steering. In the fourth model called “rescaling & reterritorialisation” we call the distribu-
tion of power regionalised. City regions – or agglomerations – became nodal points in the 
process of economic globalisation. This is a very tentative classification that shall be verified 
and improved during further research. 
Table 1: Models of governance and the distribution of power 







- Bordering, bounding, parcelization, enclo-
sure 
- Construction of inside/outside divides; con-
stitutive role of the ‘outside’ 
centralised 
dominant scale: city or 
metropolitan level 
Public choice (Poliycentrism): 
multi-centred core dominant, 
rely on market competition 
Place: 
- Proximity, spatial embedding, areal differen-
tiation 
- Construction of spatial division of labor; dif-
ferentiation of social relations horizontally 





multi-centred core less domi-
nant, government plus gov-
ernance in city-region 
Scale 
- Hierarchization, vertical differentiation 
- Construction of spatial division of labor; dif-
ferentiation of social relations vertically 
among ‘dominant’, ‘nodal’, and ‘marginal’ 
scales 
diffuse 




isation leading to sub-national 
(local) state restructuring 
Networks 
- Interconnectivity, interdependence, transver-
sal or ‘rhizomatic’ differentiation 
- Building networks of nodal connectivity; 
differentiation of social relations among 




Source: own illustration, 1 according to Savich and Vogel (2009), 2 according to (2008: 393). 
 
d) Towards a theoretical framework  
What do we have to take into account to tackle the question of governance change in Swiss 
metropolitan areas as a result of the federal agglomeration policy? The previous sections 
showed that theories of federalism help to understand systems of interlocking politics in 
multi-level governance, whereas the politics of scale approach draws attention to the relation-
ship and the distribution of power among different federal state levels. In the following, we 
combine the most relevant aspects derived from these theories. Drawing a link between theo-
ries of federalism and the politics of scale approach, this preliminary theoretical framework 
should help to analyse change in the relationship between the different federal state levels 
within the multi-tiered hierarchy.  
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As a starting point we take the general assumption derived from the politics of scale approach, 
which is that the role of city regions changed because of the economic globalisation process 
that lead to a mechanism of inter-urban competition. It is assumed that governance models in 
city regions changed, and cities and agglomerations gained steering capacities and therefore 
they have more influence in the federal system. 
Theories about politics of scale as well as theories about federalism point out that it is impor-
tant to take the federal constellation of metropolitan regions into account, in order to desig-
nate new conflict lines and changes in the relationship between different federal state levels. 
In order to analyse the Swiss case, we have to look at the national, cantonal, and communal 
level. Theories about federalism focus on the constitutional level, this comprises the identifi-
cation of the territorially organised political entities and the political structures that connect 
these levels. Also, types of decision-making and types of decision-makers have to be taken 
into account: According to federalism theories, government, political parties, public opinion, 
and experts are important players with reference to governance change. In contrast, the poli-
tics of scale approach is more concerned with geographical scales embedded in a power struc-
ture. According to the politics of scale approach, we have to focus on scalar hierarchies: what 
is the relationship between the different levels of governance and which is the dominant scale 
in metropolitan areas? To analyse the allocation of power in federal relations, we can draw a 
helpful link to theories of federalism: They propose to study centripetal and centrifugal ten-
dencies to capture federal change. Additionally, they ask to consider not only explicit but also 
implicit change of patterns of governance. 
To understand governance change, we have to ask how policy is coordinated between and 
within the different levels of governance. Whereas theories about politics of scale rarely deal 
with this topic, theories of federalism provide useful categories to study interaction and joint 
decision styles: the main distinction between vertical and horizontal cooperation and between 
tight and loose coupling helps to understand how processes between and within levels of gov-
ernance are connected.  
Against the background of the politics of scale approach, there is another aspect to consider: 
We have to take into account the two meanings of politics of scale. This means that we have 
to focus on the one hand on the construction or production of scale and its contents and on the 
other hand on the relationship between different scales within the multitiered hierarchy. 
Scales and scalar hierarchies are not pre-given or fix. Following the politics of scale approach, 
the emergence and evolution of scales and metropolitan reform initiatives result from path-
dependency. And the politics of scale approach assumes that there are political strategies that 
aim to reorganise the institutional infrastructure in metropolitan areas. Has the metropolitan 
scale really become the dominant scale in contemporary federalism? According to theories of 
politics of scale, this is the case when the metropolitan area is assumed to be the place, where 
economic development can and should take place.  
According to this tentative framework, the following empirical part discusses the Swiss fed-




Swiss agglomeration policy in a contested federal system 
Switzerland is a typical federation, organised on three political levels: the federal (national) 
level, 26 cantons, and approximately 2500 municipalities. Cantons have a strong position in 
the Swiss federal system, their autonomy is very high (Linder and Vatter, 2001, Vatter, 2006). 
Switzerland – in comparison with other federal countries – grants high tax sovereignty and 
flexibility to its member states (Braun, 2010). But the emergence of problems that affect more 
than one canton (e.g. in the field of transport, land use planning, and environment), made it 
more and more difficult to separate policy-making between the different state levels (Serdült 
and Schenkel, 2006: 554). Financial transfers between federal levels give further evidence for 
interlocking politics in the Swiss federal system (556). Debates about power, influence and 
decision-making capability of different state levels are not a new phenomenon. Historically 
speaking, this was on the agenda several times: In the second half of the 19th century, the 
distribution of weight between the cantons and the federation was highly contested 
(Freiburghaus and Buchli, 2003: 30-31). Again in the 1960s, federalism was put on the Swiss 
political agenda (ibid.): By then, the common perception was that the federal level had be-
come dominant, leaving the cantons with the task of implementation. Whereas some experts 
wanted to strengthen the influence and the competences of the cantons, for others only the 
national government was able to face the new tasks (ibid.). Since the 1970s, there have been 
discussions about task-sharing between the different state levels, vertical and horizontal fi-
nancial transfers, inter-cantonal cooperation, region-building, and even about amalgamations 
of cantons. 
The latter is certainly not a realistic scenario due to the dominant role of the cantons. But 
there are vertical and countless horizontal cooperation schemes (e.g. intercantonal 
conferences, Vatter, 2006). But political cleavages transcend horizontal and vertical collabo-
ration, which makes it difficult to find agreements (Kübler et al., 2003). This is also because 
cantons enjoy significant weight in vertical cooperation schemes due to the top-down hierar-
chy of Swiss federalism and because communes have nothing to say in the affairs of higher 
levels. Therefore, Kübler et al. (2003) see a lack of direct vertical channels of exchange be-
tween different state levels.  
As already mentioned in the introduction, Swiss metropolitan areas are highly fragmented. 
Functional urban spaces and territorially bound decision-making structures are not congruent 
at all (Kübler et al., 2003: 267). In the three-tiered federalism consisting of the national, can-
tonal and municipal level, agglomerations or metropolitan areas simply do not exist – at least 
not on the institutional level. As a result of the specific Swiss federal system, metropolitanisa-
tion led to various systems of interlocking politics (ibid.). 
Based on a new article of the revised Swiss constitution, the Swiss federal government initi-
ated in 2001 the so called “agglomeration policy”. The agglomeration policy makes the first 
time that the federal government wants to steer the urbanisation process on a national scale. 
Article 50 in the new Swiss constitution did not change the federalist task sharing between the 
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different federal state levels. Therefore, the federal government can act only in subsidiary 
terms. But still, the federal agglomeration policy aims at changing steering capacities in met-
ropolitan areas. It is an effort to support the cantons and communes in their activities of inter-
municipal cooperation. The main goals are to foster vertical co-operation, to promote horizon-
tal co-operation within agglomerations, to generate a systematic orientation of federal policies 
toward the needs of urban areas (Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung ARE and Staatssekretariat 
für Wirtschaft SECO, 2006). The three main instruments of the federal agglomeration policy 
are the “Tripartite Agglomeration Conference” (TAK), the “model projects”, and the so-
called “agglomeration programmes” (Kübler, 2006). The TAK involves all three state levels. 
The TAK's aim is to make sure that the state, cantons, cities and municipalities work together 
more closely and develop a common agglomeration policy. Therefore, this conference should 
foster vertical integration (Arn and Stecker, 2004: 13-14). With the “model projects”, the fed-
eral administration supports innovative projects. These best practice models are cooperative 
projects between community, canton and regional levels; they should foster horizontal coop-
eration (Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung ARE, 2003). “Agglomeration programmes” are 
long-term planning instruments that are elaborated jointly by cantons and communes. They 
aim to improve transport infrastructure within metropolitan areas. 
With all these instruments, the federal government wants to affect governance schemes at the 
metropolitan level. If the federal government finances the model projects and especially the 
agglomeration programmes, this is only under the condition that these projects involve area-
wide cooperation among the centre city and surrounding communes and the cantonal level. 
This means that the federal government gets involved in urban governance questions. If the 
national government intervenes at the level of communes, this means an intervention in the 
cantonal legal sovereignty (Serdült and Schenkel, 2006: 558). Kübler et al. (2003: 269) con-
cluded almost ten years ago that the implementation of the new collaboration platforms with 
the newly established federal agglomeration policy led to tensions between cities, surrounding 
communes, and cantons. Even before this new article, the federal government used to influ-
ence communal politics and policy in an indirect way, namely through legislation and subsi-
dies. And despite the new constitution and article 50, direct contact between the federal level 
and the local level is still contested (567). Cities do not have a special role in the vertical fed-
eral system and agglomerations are still not recognized in the federal System. 
The question is therefore whether the relationship between the federal, cantonal, and the local 
level changed in any way because of the federal policy. Early on, researchers doubted the 
federal agglomeration policy would be able to strengthen the position of agglomerations, be-
cause of the constitutionally given leading role of the cantons (Koll-Schretzenmayr and 
Schmid, 2003). In the last ten years, the federal government actually fostered horizontal and 
vertical cooperation within agglomerations with the instruments of the agglomeration policy 
(see Kübler and Plüss, 2010, CEAT et al., 2010). But this did not automatically lead to a 
strengthening of the cities and agglomerations; rather it was the cantons that gained a leading 
role in the implementation of the agglomeration policies (Kübler and Plüss, 2010: 22-23). 
According to these preliminary findings, the theoretical assumption that cities and metropoli-
tan regions gained influence in the federal system cannot be sustained. It is also not clear 
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whether the national scale gained weight in relation to other levels of government. But it be-
came evident that it is very difficult to make assumptions for Switzerland in general. Swiss 
agglomerations and metropolitan regions differ significantly according to forms of coopera-
tion and the relative strength of involved players (CEAT et al., 2010, Arn and Stecker, 2004). 
This evidence shows that research about changes in the relationship between different scales 
has to focus on agglomerations and metropolitan areas. Further research has to be done to 
address the question of governance change in specific city regions. We have to identify deci-
sion-making styles as well as centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in each agglomeration. In 
doing this, we will possibly be able to tell something about the political strategies behind met-
ropolitan reform initiatives. 
But what about the emergence of new state scales? Do agglomerations have become an essen-
tial new level of governance? In the Swiss metropolitan governance discourse, the term “ag-
glomeration” is very common. Although the Swiss federal system did not undergo any major 
change, the agglomeration as a possible new fourth level of governance is at least discussed. 
Whereas historically the role of different state levels was consistently debated, it was only 
recently that the idea of a totally new state level became a part of this discussion. But even 
though innovative models of cooperation in metropolitan areas have been developed recently 
(e.g. in Berne and Fribourg), there is not a real redistribution of power within the Swiss fed-
eral system. Therefore, while we observe the evolution of a new scale indeed, agglomerations 
are still more symbolic than actual levels of governance. 
Conclusion 
In 2001, a federal agglomeration policy was launched, marking the first time the federal gov-
ernment directly interfered in urban affairs. This paper addressed the question of the impact of 
this federal agglomeration policy on Swiss federalism. Did new lines of conflicts emerge and 
did the strong position of cantons in the Swiss federal system change when faced with prob-
lems of urban governance? To tackle this question, we developed a preliminary theoretical 
framework based on theories of federalism and the politics of scale approach. Whereas theo-
ries of politics of scale suggest that governance models in city regions changed, and metro-
politan regions gained steering capacities and more influence in the federal system, theories of 
federalism provide explanations for processes of governance change.  
Initial findings showed that the federal agglomeration policy fostered vertical and horizontal 
cooperation in metropolitan areas. At the same time, new lines of conflict emerged. The new 
cooperation schemes may gradually lead to a governance change, but more in an implicit way. 
So far, the hierarchy between the different state levels has not changed. The strong position of 
the cantons in Swiss federal system persists. Therefore, we came to the preliminary conclu-
sion that agglomerations have not been strengthened yet in the Swiss federal system. But 
these tentative findings also showed that it is very difficult to provide evidence on a national 
level. In order to gain more insights, we will have to take a closer look on the metropolitan 
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level. Further research needs to be done by means of case studies in several Swiss agglomera-
tions. This will allow us to test and improve the theoretical framework, too. 
One very interesting question remains, namely, whether the agglomeration has become an 
essential level of governance. The tentative findings about the federal agglomeration policy 
show that there is at least a discursive emergence of a new level of governance. Although 
agglomerations do not exist on an institutional level, the metropolitan area is perceived as the 
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